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Abstract
We develop a dynamic model to study the formation of communication networks.
In this model, individuals periodically make decisions concerning the continuation
of existing information links and the formation of new information links, with their
cohorts. These decisions trade o the costs of forming and maintaining links against
the potential rewards from doing so. We analyze the long run behavior of this process
of link formation and dissolution.
Our results establish that this process always self-organizes, i.e., irrespective of the
number of agents, and the initial network, the dynamic process converges to a
limit social communication network with probability one. Furthermore, we prove
that the limiting network is invariably either a wheel network or the empty net-
work.
We show in the (corresponding) static network formation game that, while a variety
of architectures can be sustained in equilibrium, the wheel is the unique ecient
architecture for the interesting class of parameters. Thus, our results imply that the
dynamics have strong equilibrium selection properties.
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1 Introduction
The importance of communication networks has been extensively documented in empirical
work and their role in social learning has been highlighted in recent theoretical research.
1
The nding that communication networks matter naturally leads to the question: which
network structures are reasonable? This question motivates the formulation of a theory of
network formation.
In this paper, we propose an approach to network formation which is inspired by the fol-
lowing story: consider a group of individuals who have to periodically choose an action
without being fully informed about the true payos from the dierent options. Each agent
has some information concerning the payos, which includes the agent's personal experi-
ences as well as information gathered from other individuals. Prior to choosing his next
action, an individual has an opportunity to contact
2
a subset of agents to access their
information. In deciding with whom to form a link, the individual trades-o the costs and
the potential benets from doing so. His costs and benets take into account the fact that
information has a public good aspect: well-connected people (i.e. those who possess infor-
mation collected from many sources) generate a positive externality, and the individual has
an incentive to contact such people directly rather than all the individual sources accessed
by them.
In this setting, we study the dynamic process of social communication. In particular, we
ask:
 Does the process of network formation settle down, and if so, what is the architecture
of the communication network that emerges?
 Given that information has some of the characteristics of a public good, what is the
relationship between socially ecient networks and the networks derived from choices
made by self-interested individuals?
1
See Allen (1982), Coleman (1966), Granovetter (1974) and Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) for early
work and Bala and Goyal (1993) for recent work and related references.
2
The nature of this contact depends on the context. For a scientist who is about to carry out a new
project, and would like to know about recent research in related areas, reading a working paper constitutes
a contact. For a consumer wishing to nd information about dierent brands of cars, computers or mutual
funds, accessing a web page devoted to the evaluation of these products constitutes a contact.
1
The framework we use to address the above questions has the following structure. We
consider a group of n individuals, each of whom has (private) information which is worth
V > 0. This information can be augmented by forming pairwise links with other agents;
every link has an associated cost c > 0. The public good aspect of network formation
is captured by the following assumption: when an agent i forms a link with some other
agent j he gets access to all the information possessed by the latter, including the infor-
mation that j has acquired by forming links himself. At regular intervals, an individual
gets an opportunity to revise his links with other agents.
3
When faced with this oppor-
tunity, an agent chooses a strategy { forms links with a subset of his cohorts { which is
a (myopic) best response to the existing set of links of the other agents. If more than
one strategy is optimal then he is assumed to randomize over the set of optimal pure
strategies.
The above action revision process generates a Markov chain on the state space of all net-
works. In analyzing the process of network evolution, we are naturally lead to the concept
of self-organization. We say that the dynamic process exhibits self-organization from an
initial network if the Markov chain converges (in nite time) to a limiting network, with
probability one.
In our formulation, with n agents the total number of networks is given by 2
n(n 1)
, im-
plying that the cardinality of the state space increases very rapidly with the number of
agents in the society. Intuitively, because the coordination problem becomes increasingly
complicated as the size of the society increases, it would seem that self-organization will at
best occur in small societies and perhaps only from certain initial networks. Nevertheless,
our main results, Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, yield the following startling conclusion: irrespec-
tive of the number of agents in the society, and the initial network, the learning process
invariably exhibits self-organization, i.e. converges with probability one to a limit network.
Our results also characterize precisely the architecture
4
of the limiting networks: if the
value of private information with any agent V is more than the cost of forming a link c,
then the process almost surely converges to a wheel network, which is the unique ecient
3
Formally, in every period each agent, with positive probability, gets an option to form or dissolve links
with other agents. This probability is assumed to be independent across agents.
4
By architecture we mean the equivalence class of all networks obtained by permuting the strategies of
agents in a given network. See the discussion in Section 2.
2
architecture in our model.
5
Thus not only is there self-organization, but it is also ecient.
When V is less than c the process converges either to the empty network or to a wheel.
Thus self-organization also occurs in this case, but eciency may not be attained. In
fact, it is possible to show that the process exhibits path-dependence: starting from certain
initial networks, there is a positive probability of converging either to a wheel or to the
empty network.
The results on self-organization are striking for several reasons. The rst reason is related
to the convergence of the dynamic process. Our theorems reveal that even when agents
pursue self-interested goals in a myopic way, and make no attempt to coordinate their
actions with other agents through a social planner or institution, they can nevertheless
achieve a stable pattern of communication links in the long run.
Secondly, we note that the static (one-shot) game has many equilibrium networks with
widely varying architectural and welfare properties (see Propositions 2.1-2.5).
6
The dy-
namics thus possess remarkable equilibrium selection properties: while there are a number
of architectures which can be supported as Nash equilibria of the static game, the learning
process converges to a network having one of only two such architectures { the empty
network and the wheel.
The third reason relates to the rate of convergence. The value of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2
would be compromised if self-organization took place very slowly. Our simulations of
the learning dynamics suggest that the rate of convergence to a limiting network is ex-
tremely rapid both when communication costs are low (V > c) and when they are high
(V < c). In the former case, with n = 7 agents there are 2
n(n 1)
= 2
42
 4  10
12
pos-
sible networks, yet the process converges on average in less than 40 periods to a wheel!
When the communication costs are high (V < c) convergence is even more rapid. Fur-
thermore, in virtually all cases, the limit network is a wheel rather than the empty net-
work.
5
The graph of a wheel has agents located on a circle, with each agent accessing his predecessor. We say
that a network is ecient if it maximizes the net aggregate benet, i.e. the total value of information that
all the individuals acquire less the cost of all the communication channels that support the network (for
formal denitions see Section 2).
6
See Figure 2 below for some examples of equilibrium networks in a society with n = 5 agents. In
addition, our computations reveal that if V > c then for n = 3; 4; 5 and 6 the number of equilibrium
networks in the one-shot game is 5, 58, 1069 and in excess of 20,000, respectively. This corresponds to 2,
5, 16 and more than 30 possible architectures for n = 3,4,5 and 6 respectively.
3
In order to study the evolution of networks, we have chosen a particularly simple para-
metric model of social communication. Our choice is motivated by the need for analytical
tractability: even in such a basic model, a full characterization of the dynamics is quite
dicult. One simplifying assumption we have made in particular is to suppose that in-
formation does not \decay" in the process of transmission across agents.
7
To investigate
the robustness of our results on self-organization, we briey discuss an extension of the
model where the quality of information decays as it is communicated across agents. This is
a very complex problem: however, our preliminary analysis and simulations indicate that
in societies of moderate size, self-organization occurs with high probability and that the
limiting networks are natural generalizations of a wheel network. Interestingly, in this case,
self-organizing networks seem to be constituted of local neighborhoods: dierent subsets of
agents form small wheels { the local neighborhoods { while other agents have links across
these wheels.
8
Our paper is a contribution to the theory of network formation. There is a large literature
in economics (in addition to work in sociology and computer science) on the subject of
networks.
9
Much of this work is concerned with the eciency aspects of dierent commu-
nication networks within rms and takes a `planner's problem' approach to characterize
optimal networks.
10
By contrast, we are concerned with the self-organization properties
of networks and look at social and economic settings where individuals decide indepen-
dently on their sources of information and these decisions dene a social communication
network.
In recent years, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), among others, have studied network forma-
tion in a similar spirit.
11
The existing papers have been concerned with the relationship
between ecient and sustainable networks, in static settings. This relationship is also one
of our concerns, but the present paper departs from the existing work by considering the
7
Assuming no information decay is analogous to the assumption of \no friction" in physics, \markets
with perfect information" in a general equilibrium model and \zero transaction costs" in nance.
8
See Figure 18 below for some examples of such networks.
9
For detailed reviews of this literature, see Antonelli (1992), Flament (1963), Harary (1972),
Luce (1951), Marshak and Radner (1972), Rogers (1971).
10
For recent work in this tradition, see Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), Radner (1993), and the papers
referred to therein. Hendricks, Piccione and Tan (1995) use a similar approach to characterize the optimal
ight network for an unregulated airline which has to serve a given set of cities.
11
Their paper draws upon the work of Myerson and Aumann, among others, which studies coali-
tion formation in (cooperative) game theoretic models. This work is surveyed in Myerson (1991) and
van den Nouweland (1993). See also Dutta, van den Nouweland and Tijs (1995) and Dutta and Mut-
tuswamy (1996).
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dynamics of network formation. We believe that the dynamics are important for several
reasons. Firstly, networks are observed to change over time and it is natural to study
their evolution. Secondly, a dynamic formulation allows us to consider phenomena such
as path-dependence which are of central importance and cannot be understood in a static
model. Finally, it helps us select between dierent equilibria: the results in this paper are
especially useful in this context.
Our paper also departs from previous work in considering asymmetric link formation: we
allow for agent i to form a link with agent j without the converse being true. By con-
trast, previous literature has concentrated on models of symmetric link formation. This
dierence in formulation is motivated by a wide range of examples where communication is
naturally viewed as asymmetric.
12
In view of these dierences, our work should be viewed
as complementary to the earlier analyses of networks.
More generally, the present paper should be seen as part of a research program in which the
structure of interaction among individuals is explicitly modeled and its aggregate implica-
tions are studied. This research problem has received growing attention in the recent work
on the evolution of conventions as well as on the diusion of new technologies.
13
For the
most part, this work takes as given the existence of some network structure and proceeds
to analyze its implications, see, e.g., the survey paper by Kirman (1993).
14
We end this discussion by relating our results to the recent research on boundedly rational
players learning to play Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game (see e.g., Hurkens (1994)
and Sanchirico (1996)). This line of research shows, roughly speaking, that if the learning
process satises certain properties then the dynamics converge to a minimal `curb' set of
the one-shot game in the long run. The game we analyze in this paper is quite `large'
and the real issue here is: what do the minimal curb sets look like? Our main results,
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, characterize the minimal curb sets as well as establish convergence.
12
The examples mentioned earlier in the introduction fall in this category.
13
For studies of interaction structure and evolution of conventions, see Anderlini and Ianni (1996), Elli-
son (1993), Goyal and Janssen (1993) and Goyal (1996). For work on diusion of new technologies/products
see Allen (1982), An and Kiefer (1992), Bala and Goyal (1993), Besley and Case (1994), Coleman (1966),
Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995) and Rogers (1971, 1983).
14
An exception to this approach is the work by Mailath, Samuelson and Shaked (1992,1996), which
explores endogenous interactions within a matching model. They show that when agents may choose
whom they wish to interact with, heterogeneous outcomes which partition the society into groups with
dierent payos can be evolutionarily stable. Our concern is not about heterogeneity of outcomes, but
whether agents can learn to attain a stable pattern of communication when information is a public good.
5
We also note that since the learning process we study is dierent, the convergence results
are of independent interest.
The plan of the paper is as follows. We introduce the basic model and present the static
results in Section 2. The dynamics are analyzed in Section 3. We consider a model with
information decay in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes. All the proofs are collected in
an appendix at the end of the paper.
2 The Model and Static Results
Let N be a set of agents and let i and j be typical members of this set. The agents are
numbered from 1 to n. To avoid trivialities, we shall assume throughout that n  3. Each
agent has some private information which is commonly valued at V > 0. An agent can aug-
ment this information by communicating with other people; this communication takes time
and eort and is made possible via the setting up of pair-wise channels of communications,
each of which cost c > 0.
15
A strategy of agent i 2 N is a (row) vector g
i
= (g
i;1
; : : : ; g
i;i 1
; g
i;i+1
; : : : ; g
i;n
) where
g
i;j
2 f0; 1g for each j 2 Nnfig. The statement `g
i;j
= 1' is interpreted as saying that
agent i forms a link with agent j (in other words, has direct access to j's information) while
g
i;j
= 0 states that i does not directly communicate with agent j. The set of all strategies
of agent i is denoted by G
i
. Since agent i has the option of forming or not forming a link
with each of the remaining n   1 agents, the number of strategies of agent i is clearly
jG
i
j = 2
n 1
. The set G = G
1
 : : :G
n
is the strategy space of all the agents. A strategy
prole g = (g
1
; : : : ; g
n
) can be represented as a directed network . Figure 1 below provides
an example with n = 3 agents:
1 2
3
 
 

	

Figure 1
15
Some of the material in this section is drawn from an earlier paper by Goyal (1993), which was
circulated under the title \Sustainable Communication Networks".
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Here agent 1 has formed links with agents 2 and 3, agent 3 has a link with agent 1 while
agent 2 does not link up with any other agent. Note that g
i;j
= 1 is represented by an edge
starting at j with the arrowhead pointing at i. Since there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the set of all networks with n vertices and the set of strategies G, we shall use the
terms `network' and `strategy prole' interchangeably.
Our model assumes that even if i does not form a link with j, i may be able to obtain
j's information indirectly, say by forming a link with someone who forms a link with
j, and so on. To formalize this notion, we require some additional denitions. In the
network g, let N
d
(i; g) = fk 2 N j g
i;k
= 1g, i.e. N
d
(i; g) is the set of agents with
whom i maintains a link. We next say that there is a path from j to i in the network
g if either g
i;j
= 1 or there exist agents j
1
, : : :, j
m
distinct from each other and from
i and j such that g
i;j
1
= g
j
1
;j
2
= : : : = g
j
m
;j
= 1. For example in Figure 1 there is
a path from agent 2 to agent 3. The notation \j
g
 ! i" indicates that there exists a
path in the network g from j to i. Likewise j
g
 ! i indicates that there is a path from
i to j and also from j to i. The length of the path j
g
 ! i is given by the number
of intervening links. Thus in Figure 1, the length of the path 2
g
 ! 3 is 2. In more
complicated networks, there will typically exist more than one path between any two
points. A geodesic from j to i is a path from j to i of minimum length. If there is a
path from j to i in a network g, then the distance from j to i denoted by d(i; j; g) is
the length of a geodesic from j to i. We shall adopt the convention that if in a graph
g there exists no path between two points j and i then d(i; j; g) = 1. Also we shall
assume that a single agent i constitutes a trivial path and that d(i; i; g) = 0, for all
g 2 G.
Furthermore we dene N(i; g) = fk 2 N j k
g
 ! ig [ fig. The set N(i; g) is the set of all
agents whose information i accesses either directly or through other agents. We use the
convention that i belongs to his own neighborhood, i.e. i 2 N(i; g) for all g 2 G. Finally,
let g
 i
denote the network obtained when all of agent i's links are removed. Note that the
network g
 i
can be regarded as the strategy prole where i chooses not to link with anyone.
The network g can be written as g = g
 i
 g
i
where the `' indicates that g is formed
as the union of the links in g
 i
and g
i
. Agent i's payo from the network g = g
 i
 g
i
is
dened as

i
(g) = jN(i; g)jV   jN
d
(i; g)jc: (1)
7
In other words, i's payo is V times the number of agents accessed in the network less c
times the number of agents with whom he forms links. Thus in Figure 1 agent 1's payo
is 3V   2c, agent 2's is V and agent 3's is 3V   c. Given a network g, the strategy g
i
is
said to be a best response of agent i to g
 i
if

i
(g
 i
 g
i
)  
i
(g
 i
 g
0
i
); for all g
0
i
2 G
i
: (2)
The set of all of agent i's pure strategy best responses to g is denoted BR
i
(g). Lastly, a
network g = (g
1
; : : : ; g
n
) is said to be sustainable if agents are playing a Nash equilibrium,
i.e. for each j 2 N we have g
j
2 BR
j
(g).
In our framework, the eectiveness with which useful private information gets communi-
cated across the society is of interest. Given the cost-reward structure developed so far,
this issue turns on the pattern and number of channels of communication in a network. The
main welfare property of networks we consider is aggregate eciency. A communication
network is said to be ecient if it maximizes the dierence between the aggregate payos
and the aggregate cost of the channels. Formally, the social welfare level of a network g is
given by
W (g) =
X
i2N

i
(g) =
X
i2N
jN(i; g)jV  
X
i2N
jN
d
(i; g)jc: (3)
A network g is said to be ecient if W (g)  W (g
0
), for all g
0
2 G. A communication
network g is called connected if for every pair of agents i,j 2 N , we have i
g
 ! j. This
is equivalent to saying that N(i; g) = N for all i 2 N . A network which is not con-
nected is referred to as being disconnected. Furthermore, a network is said to be empty
if N(i; g) = fig for all i 2 N . We denote the empty network as g
e
. Next, a network
g is said to be minimally connected if the deletion of any link in g renders the network
disconnected, i.e. if for any i,j 2 N satisfying g
i;j
= 1, the network created by setting
g
i;j
= 0 is disconnected.
Lastly, we make a distinction between a network and a network architecture. A network g
is simply an element of G. Two networks g 2 G and g
0
2 G are equivalent if g
0
is obtained
as a permutation of the strategies of agents in g. (For example, if g is the network in
Figure 1, and g
0
is the network where agents 1 and 2 are interchanged, then g and g
0
are
equivalent). The equivalence relation partitions G into classes: each class is referred to as
an architecture. While the relevant concept for agents in the game is the specic network
which is played, our primary interest in analyzing the game lies in the architecture of the
network.
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2.1 Sustainable and Ecient Communication Networks
We begin by characterizing sustainable and ecient networks. Our rst result considers
the implications of sustainability for the structure of networks.
Proposition 2.1 A sustainable network is either connected or empty.
This proposition highlights a general property of networks in which agents are symmetri-
cally located vis-a-vis information and costs of access: such networks cannot be partially
connected. The intuition underlying this property may be understood in terms of the in-
centives to form links in a network with (say) two distinct components. In a sustainable
network, if an agent forms links then she must be getting non-negative payos. It follows
then that any agent outside a component can always increase his payo by simply linking
up with some member of this component. Thus either all members of a component are
getting negative payos, in which case the component cannot be part of a sustainable
network, or the network will be connected.
The set of connected networks is quite large and we would like to further specify the nature
of sustainable networks. This motivates the next two propositions. Recall that a network
is minimally connected if the deletion of any link renders it disconnected.
Proposition 2.2 Suppose V > c > 0. Then a network is sustainable if and only if it is
minimally connected.
This proposition characterizes the set of sustainable networks for the case where V > c.
The following `monotonicity' result concerns the case of higher cost levels. Given a pair of
values for V and c, let S(V; c) denote the set of sustainable networks.
Proposition 2.3 (a) Suppose V < c < c
0
. Then S(V; c
0
)  S(V; c). (b) If instead we have
0 < c < V < c
0
then S(V; c
0
)  S(V; c) [ fg
e
g where g
e
is the empty network.
Figure 2a shows two important sustainable network architectures for V > c when there
are n = 5 agents. Note that in the rst network every agent communicates with agent 4
and vice-versa. We refer to this as a star network g
s
. The other network in Figure 2a is
9
termed a wheel network g
w
.
16
Many other minimally connected (and hence sustainable for
V > c) networks may be found. Figure 2b provides some examples.
Taken together, Propositions 2.1-2.3 show that the set of sustainable networks consists of a
subset of the set of minimally connected networks and the empty network g
e
. In particular
we note the following:
Proposition 2.4 The architecture of sustainable networks is related to the cost levels.
(a) If 0 < c < V then the wheel and star, among other architectures, are sustainable. (b) If
V < c < (n   1)V then the wheel is sustainable, but so is the empty network. The star is
not sustainable. (c) If c > (n   1)V then the empty network g
e
is the unique sustainable
architecture.
The above results help us to understand the types of networks that will emerge when
individuals make link formation decisions, based on rational calculations concerning per-
sonal payos. Given this characterization, it is natural to ask: are individual incentives
for link formation consistent with aggregate (social) welfare maximization? The follow-
ing result responds to this question by providing a complete characterization of ecient
networks.
Proposition 2.5 The ecient architecture depends on the cost levels. (a) If 0 < c <
(n   1)V then the wheel is the unique ecient architecture. (b) If c > (n   1)V then the
empty network is the unique ecient architecture.
A comparison between Propositions 2.4 and 2.5 suggests both over-provision as well as
under-provision of communication links is possible (relative to the socially ecient level).
Related to this is the nding that the ecient network is always sustainable. These results
point to a more general feature: there exist multiple equilibria in the (static) communica-
tion network game. These equilibria are welfare ranked and correspond to very dierent
architectures.
17
This fact motivates an inquiry into the dynamic stability of dierent net-
works, a subject that is studied in the following section.
16
Note that with n agents there are n possible `star' networks corresponding to which agent i acts as the
`central coordinator'. All of these come under the equivalence class of the star architecture. Likewise, the
wheel architecture is the equivalence class of (n   1)! networks consisting of all permutations of n agents
in a circle. The empty architecture coincides with the empty network g
e
since there is only one network
with no links across agents.
17
If we suppose c 2 (0; V ), then the number of sustainable networks equals 5, 58, 1069 and in excess of
20000 for n = 3,4,5 and 6 respectively, with the corresponding number of architectures being 2, 5, 16 and
more than 30.
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3 The Dynamics of Network Formation
We analyze a simple social learning model, which is based on a modied version of the
best response dynamic. The rst modication is that agents exhibit `inertia': i.e. in each
period, with a xed positive probability less than one, agent i maintains the action chosen
in the previous period. Furthermore, if the agent does not exhibit inertia, then he chooses
a myopic pure strategy best response to the actions of all other agents in the previous
period: if there are many such best responses, each of them is assumed to be chosen with
positive probability. The last assumption introduces a certain degree of `mixing' in the
dynamic process.
18
To state these assumptions formally, let G
 i
denote the strategy space of all agents except
i and for given a set A, let (A) denote the set of probability distributions on A. We sup-
pose that for each agent i there exists a number p
i
2 (0; 1) and a function 
i
: G ! (G
i
)
where 
i
satises

i
(g) 2 Interior (BR
i
(g
 i
)); 8g
 i
2 G
 i
: (4)
For g^
i
in the support of 
i
(g), the notation 
i
(g)(g^
i
) denotes the probability assigned to g^
i
by the probability measure 
i
(g). If the network at time t  1 is g
t
= g
t
 i
g
t
i
, the strategy
of agent i at time t + 1 is assumed to be given by:
g
t+1
i
=

g^
i
2 support 
i
(g); with probability p
i
 
i
(g)(g^
i
);
g
t
i
; with probability 1  p
i
.
(5)
Equation (5) states that with probability p
i
2 (0; 1), agent i chooses a naive best response
to the strategies of the other agents. The function 
i
dictates how agent i randomizes be-
tween best responses if more than one exists. Furthermore, with probability 1  p
i
agent i
exhibits `inertia', i.e. maintains his previous strategy. Thus in the network of Figure 1
(reproduced below for convenience) assuming V > c, agent 2 has two best responses; to
form a link with either 1 or 3 (but not both). If agents 1 and 3 exhibit inertia, either
Figure 1' or Figure 1" can occur with positive probability.
1 2
3
 
 

	

Figure 1
1 2
3
 
 

	
 -
Figure 1'
1 2
3
 
 

	

@
@
R
Figure 1"
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In recent years, considerable work has been done using the best response dynamic process. For a
discussion of the behavioral and informational assumptions implicit in such a dynamic, see the discussion
in Mailath (1992).
11
Supposing in addition that agents randomize independently of each other, our rules con-
cerning agent choices induce a transition matrix T mapping the statespace G to the set
of all probability distributions (G) on G. Let fX
t
g be the stationary Markov chain
starting from the initial network g 2 G with the above transition matrix. The process
fX
t
g describes the dynamics of network evolution given our assumptions on agent behav-
ior.
To get a rst impression of the dynamics we simulate a sample trajectory with n = 5
agents, for a total of twelve periods (Figure 3). The initial network (labelled t = 1) has
been drawn at random from the set of all directed networks with 5 agents.
19
As can be
seen, the choices of agents evolve rapidly and settle down by period 11. The resultant
communication network is a wheel. Having reached a wheel, the process stays there for-
ever since the wheel is an absorbing state (formally, it is a strict Nash equilibrium and
all such equilibria are absorbing states). The simulation naturally suggests the concept of
self-organization in communication networks, which we now dene.
Denition 3.1 Fix an initial network g. The stochastic process fX
t
g is said to exhibit self-
organization if starting at g the process converges to a limiting network, with probability 1.
If convergence occurs with probability less than 1, we say that there is incomplete self-
organization.
The notion of self-organization (when it occurs) is an appealing one because it implies that
agents who are myopically pursuing self-interested goals are nevertheless able to attain a
stable pattern of communication links in a nite amount of time. Since the number of
possible networks increases very rapidly with the number of agents,
20
it would seem that
self-organization can only be expected for small values of n, and even then perhaps only
from certain initial networks. We can however show the following result:
Theorem 3.1 Suppose V > c > 0. For any n and any initial network g the learning
process fX
t
g exhibits self-organization, i.e. converges with probability one in nite time to
a limiting network. The limiting network is always a wheel.
19
In period t  2, the choices of agents who exhibit inertia have been drawn in uninterrupted lines, while
those whose choices are best responses have been drawn in lines interrupted by dots.
20
Recall that for n agents there are 2
n(n 1)
networks.
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The broad strategy behind the proof is to demonstrate that every network dierent from
the wheel g
w
is transient. We do this by showing that starting from any network g the
learning process converges to a wheel in nitely many steps with positive probability. Since
a wheel (being a strict Nash equilibrium network) is an absorbing state, the conclusion then
follows from standard results in the theory of Markov chains.
The main ideas of the proof can then be understood in the context of a simple example
which we now discuss. Suppose that the initial `state' of the system is given by the network
g depicted in Figure 4. We initially suppose that there are seven agents labelled E
1
, : : :, E
7
with links depicted as in the gure. There is also a distinguished agent labelled `n' in the
network upon whom we focus: in the proof, given the initial network g, the distinguished
agent may be chosen arbitrarily.
We rst characterize the best response of agent n given this network. Lemmas 3.1 to
3.3 in the Appendix show that this can be found as follows: rst delete all the links
starting from or going to n in the graph g. Next, we can order the agents E
1
to E
7
in
the form of a `tree' as depicted in Figure 5 (ignore the arrows with dots for the mo-
ment). Note that agents E
3
, E
6
and E
7
represent the `tree-tops' as no other agents
observe these agents. Since V > c it is worthwhile for agent n to have a link with
each of these agents; furthermore since the `tree-top' agents observe every other agent,
n need not establish any other link in his best response. Consequently n's best response
is as shown by the red arrows in Figure 5. Since each agent independently chooses a
best response with probability p
i
2 (0; 1), with probability of at least p
n

Q
j 6=n
(1   p
j
)
the stochastic process will move from g to the network g
0
in Figure 5. We use this
idea repeatedly in the proof: at each stage we pick a suitably chosen agent, allow him
to play his best response and suppose that all other agents display inertia. Under the
assumptions of our learning process, the new network occurs with positive probability
given its predecessor. Before passing to the next step, we remark that the network g
0
in Figure 5 does not depict links that other agents have with agent n which are unal-
tered when n chooses his best response. Thus in Figure 4, E
1
, E
3
, E
5
and E
7
have
links with n and these are not shown in g
0
. The reason for our omission is that given
the rules of the process, it does not matter for the proof whether or not these links ex-
ist.
In the next step, we pick agent E
1
to play his best response, with all other agents ex-
hibiting inertia. Agent E
1
is a `bottom' or `root' agent vis-a-vis agent n since, in g
0
, he
13
does not observe any other agent (apart possibly from n himself). Furthermore we see
that agent n obtains information from all the agents in the society in g
0
. It follows that
agent E
1
can obtain all the information in the society by establishing a link with n. Since
V > c, forming a link with n is in fact a best response for E
1
. The graph g
00
in Figure 6
shows the new state of the system after E
1
has played this best response (with of course
all other agents exhibiting inertia). We see that in Figure 6, E
2
and E
3
continue to be
`bottom' agents vis-a-vis agent n, i.e. they have no links apart (possibly) from n himself.
Thus a best response for E
2
is to simply link up with E
1
, since in g
00
, E
1
obtains all the
information in the society. Subsequently a best response for E
3
is to have a link with
E
2
. In Figure 7, we have collapsed these two steps into one to show the resulting network
g^.
For the next step we see that E
4
is a `second level' agent: she has a link with some of the
`bottom' agents of the tree in g^ but with no one else (again, apart possibly from n). Thus
a best response of agent E
4
to g^ is simply to form a link with E
3
since E
3
now obtains all
the information in the society. The resulting network in shown in Figure 8. It now follows
that agent E
5
, who is a `third-rung' agent (i.e. observes no agent higher than `second-rung'
agents) can simply form a link with agent E
4
as his best response. Furthermore, agent E
6
can then link with E
5
as his best response, to yield the network in Figure 9. The penul-
timate step occurs when agent 7 forms a link with E
6
as a best response. The resulting
network is a `hyperwheel', i.e. a network which contains the wheel as a sub-network, as
in Figure 10. If agent n now chooses his best response, a wheel results (with positive
probability), as in Figure 11.
The complications which make the actual proof lengthier than the above description sug-
gests arise from the possibility thatE
1
to E
7
in the original network g of Figure 4 may not be
agents, but in fact groups of agents who all communicate with each other by links entirely
within the group. (In the proof such a group is referred to as a component). Lemmas 3.1
to 3.3 show that given any network g, and a distinguished agent n, the remaining agents
can be classied into components E
1
, : : :,E
m
partially ordered as in Figure 5. Lemma 3.7
in the Appendix shows that when we move from the network like the one in Figure 5 to
the one in Figure 6, all the agents within the component E
1
will (with positive probability)
arrange themselves in a linear `chain'. The same is shown at subsequent steps for the
components E
2
, E
3
, etc. (also in Lemma 3.7). The result then follows in the manner of
the above example.
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We next examine the case where V < c. The analysis here is more complicated. To illus-
trate the main dierences we present an example where n = 3. Clearly, if c > 2V then
the only sustainable network is the empty one. Furthermore, it is easy to see that in this
case, starting from any network, the process will converge to the empty network eventually.
The interesting case arises when c 2 (V; 2V ). We show that for this parameter range the
process may exhibit path-dependence: there exist initial networks g from which there is a
positive probability of the process converging either to a wheel or to the empty network.
To demonstrate the possibility of path dependency, suppose that the initial network is a
star as shown in Figure 12a.
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Starting from the network in Figure 12a, note that a best response for agent 2 is to form
a link with agent 3 and disassociate from agent 1. If the other two agents exhibit in-
ertia, there is a positive probability of moving to the network depicted in Figure 12b.
Likewise, if agent 1 chooses his best response to the new network with the other two
agents maintaining their original links, the process transits to the wheel displayed in Fig-
ure 12c where it is absorbed. On the other hand, starting from the same network as
in 12a, it is easily established that if the agents choose their best response in the order
1, 3, 2 and 3 then the process will be absorbed into the empty network. Our analysis
thus shows that there is a `phase transition' in the dynamics when c crosses the threshold
V .
The above example raises the general question: under what circumstances does the pro-
cess display self-organization and if so, what are the limiting networks when V < c? The
following result provides a complete answer to this question.
Theorem 3.2 Suppose V < c. For any n and starting from any initial network g, the
(stochastic) network fX
t
g exhibits self-organization. The limiting network is either a wheel
or the empty network.
As in Theorem 3.1, the rst point to note concerns the best response of agent n. When
V < c it is not always optimal to connect with all tree-tops. The proof exploits this
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idea and begins by dividing the set of networks into two subsets. The rst subset con-
sists of networks with the property that the best response of every agent involves forming
no links. We observe that for this subset of networks the dynamic process converges to
the empty network, with probability 1. The second subset comprises those networks in
which at least one agent has a best response which involves link formation. The rst step
here is to note that there is an agent n whose best response involves forming links with
some of the tree-tops. Consider the new network formed after n has chosen his best re-
sponse. The second step considers the best response of a bottom agent such as E
1
(as
in Figures 4-7). Two cases arise here: rst, that n observes all agent who observe him,
and second, that n is observed by other agents who are not observed by n. We focus on
the rst case. We show that it is optimal for the bottom agent E
1
to form a link with
agent n only and with no other agent. For the second case, we show that agent E
1
forms
a link with some agent k 6= n who is linked with n and is \furthest" away from E
1
. The
subsequent steps follow along the lines of Theorem 3.1. The proof thus establishes that
starting from any network in this subset, there is a strictly positive probability of transit-
ing to a wheel (which is an absorbing network). This observation along with the example
above establishes that if the initial network lies in the second set then the dynamic pro-
cess converges with probability 1, and the limiting network is either a wheel or the empty
network.
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 show that the process converges and characterize the limiting net-
works. The value of these results would be diminished if the rate of convergence was very
slow. In our setting a slow rate of convergence is a denite possibility since with as few as
n = 7 agents there are 2
42
 4 10
12
possible networks. These considerations motivate an
examination of the rate of convergence.
In what follows we report on some simulations of the dynamic process for n varying from
3 to 7. In the simulations we assume that p
i
= p for all agents. Furthermore, let
^
 be such
that it assigns equal probability to all best responses of an agent given a network g. We
assume that all agents have the same function
^
. For a xed value n, the initial network
g is chosen at random from the set of all networks with n vertices, and the process is sim-
ulated until it converges to a limiting network. When V > c > 0, the average convergence
times over 2000 simulations for dierent values of n and p are shown in Figure 13. Note
that except for n = 3, the average convergence time increases if p is close to zero or one.
The intuition for this nding is that when p is small, there is a very high probability that
the state of the system does not change very much from one period to the next, which
16
raises the convergence time. When p is very large, there is a high probability that \most"
agents move simultaneously. This raises the likelihood of mis-coordination which slows
the process. The convergence time is thus lowest for intermediate values of p where these
two eects are balanced. Remarkably the minimum convergence time increases only slowly
as n increases. Even with over four trillion networks (n = 7), the average convergence
time for p = 0:4 is less than 40 periods! The average convergence times are even lower
when the communication cost is higher, as in Figure 14, which displays the results when
c 2 (V; 2V ).
21
Overall, there is a strong tendency towards rapid self-organization in our
model.
We nally comment on the role of two assumptions on the dynamic process: the random-
izing over best responses and the inertia hypothesis. Recall, that in the above process, if
an agent i has two or more best responses to a given network then he randomizes between
them according to the function 
i
. Given our observations in Section 2, it can be seen
that Theorems 3.1-3.2 will not hold in the absence of this condition. This is because in the
absence of randomization all Nash equilibria are absorbing and there are a large number of
equilibria in the one-shot link formation game. Randomization ensures that the dynamic
process moves away from non-strict Nash equilibria eventually and that only the strict
Nash equilibria are rest points of the system. This property of the dynamics is thus crucial
for equilibrium selection.
Our assumption that an agent i exhibits \inertia" with probability 1   p
i
is also crucial
for the results. Consider the network depicted in Figure 15a and suppose that V > c >
0.
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It is easily veried that in this network each agent has a unique best response. If p
i
= 1
for all i (every agent chooses his best response with probability one) then the network
in Figure 15b results. Likewise, starting from the latter network, the former results
if every agent chooses their best response, leading to a two-period cycle. This implies
21
The faster convergence is not because the higher cost of communication results in a greater tendency to
converge to the empty network. In our simulations for n = 4, convergence to the empty network occurred
only once or twice per 2000 simulations and for n = 5,6 and 7 it was never once observed. The faster rate
of self-organization seems to be because there are fewer best responses for each agent when c > V .
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that Theorem 3.1 no longer obtains if agents do not exhibit some inertia. The role of
the inertia assumption is thus to eliminate cycles which arise due to miscoordination by
agents.
4 Information Decay
While the results in previous section provide a sharp characterization of limit outcomes in
the learning process, they require the assumption that information does not \decay", i.e. in-
formation obtained through indirect links have the same value as that obtained through
direct communication. This assumption can possibly serve as a reasonable approximation
if the size of the society is \small", say n = 3,4 or 5. For large n, however, it is unlikely that
a network such as the wheel will be sustainable because information will be transmitted
through a long chain of links, with the attendant possibility that its quality gets degraded
in the process.
In general, the process of network formation in the presence of information decay is very
complex. In this section, we report some preliminary work which focuses on the issue of
how information decay aects our earlier results on self-organization.
We model the possibility of decay by introducing a parameter  2 [0; 1]. Given a network
g, it is now assumed that if an agent i has a link with another agent j, i.e. g
i;j
= 1, then
agent i receives information of value V from j. More generally if the shortest path in the
network from j to i is k  1 links, then the value of agent j's information to i is 
k
V . Thus
decay is assumed to be geometric, and our earlier analysis of \no decay" corresponds to
the case  = 1. The costs of link formation are still taken to be c > 0 per link for each
agent.
The learning dynamics are taken to be the same as in Section 3. We start by noting
that what matters for our analysis are the relative values of c=V and . It is easy to
show that if 0 < c=V <    
2
then the dominant strategy for all agents is to form
links with every other agent. Hence the dynamic process will self-organize to the full
network with probability 1. Likewise, in a society with n agents, if c=V >
P
n 1
i=1

i
then it is easily seen that the dominant strategy for each agent is not to form links
with any other agent. Hence, self-organization to the empty network will occur with
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probability 1. The interesting range for studying self-organization is therefore as fol-
lows:
   
2
<
c
V
<
n 1
X
i=1

i
: (6)
If n = 3 or 4, the number of communication networks is relatively small, and it is possible
to prove self-organization in a number of situations in the above parameter range. We
characterize the outcomes in Figures 16 and 17.
Figure 16 covers the case of n = 3. It shows that if c=V 2 (   
2
; ) then the process
fX
t
g converges with probability 1 to a wheel, while if c=V 2 (;  + 
2
) then the process
converges to a limit network with probability 1. In the latter case the limit network is
either a wheel or the empty network.
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Figure 17 summarizes the ndings for the case of n = 4. We see that if c=V 2 (   
3
; )
then fX
t
g process exhibits self-organization, and the limit networks are either a star or
a wheel, while if c=V 2 (;  + 
2
+ 
3
) then self-organization also occurs, either to a
wheel or to the empty network.
23
If c=V 2 (   
2
;    
3
) then our simulations reveal
that self-organization may be incomplete from certain initial networks, i.e. with strictly
positive probability convergence to a limiting network does not occur. This is related
to the fact that a wheel is no longer sustainable in this parameter region. Given a
choice of getting information third-hand (as will happen in a wheel with four agents)
each agent will strictly prefer to form two communication links. Thus agents continu-
ally attempt to form a wheel, but are always thwarted by individual incentives to behave
otherwise.
For higher values of n, analytical results are dicult to obtain as the number of cases to
be considered becomes very large. Our simulations indicate that for each n there are pa-
rameter regions dened by complicated polynomial boundaries in which self-organization
and incomplete self-organization are seen to occur.
24
By simulating the process at a grid
of parameter values
25
in the range c=V 2 (   
2
;
P
n 1
i=1

i
) we found that convergence
22
With n = 3 there are 64 possible networks; these networks may be classied into 3 possible types,
with each type having at most four subtypes. The above characterization is proved by showing that the
network of each subtype is transient and converges to a wheel or (depending upon the parameter values)
to a wheel or the empty network. The proof is available from the authors on request.
23
With 4 agents in the society, the number of possible networks is 2
12
= 4096, which complicates the
analysis. The proof, which consists of examining about 120 dierent subtypes of networks, is extremely
tedious and as in the case of n = 3, omitted.
24
Based upon our simulations, we believe that these boundaries are dened by polynomials up to de-
gree n  1.
25
More than 2000 combinations of c=V and  for each n.
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to a limiting network occurred in 100%, 92:6%, 89:1%, 84:0%, 79:7%, 80:1% and 76:2%
of the parameter values as n ranged from n = 3 to n = 9. Since with n = 9 agents
there are more than 10
21
networks, the high probabilities of self-organization are remark-
able.
The set of limiting networks in the presence of information decay is also of interest. When
c=V < , limiting networks which are stars, wheels, or combinations of the two types tend
to occur. When c=V > , the star, or star-like networks are no longer sustainable. In this
case, limit networks tend to be wheels, collections of wheels connected to each other or the
empty network. The (non-empty) self-organizing networks thus appear to be constituted
of local neighborhoods. Figure 18 displays some of the possible limit networks for dierent
n.
To summarize our discussion, in moderately sized societies, self-organization occurs with
high probability, and the limiting networks are either the empty network or intuitive gen-
eralizations of the wheel. Thus, while our results on network formation in the presence of
information decay are not as clear-cut as in the earlier section, the simulations and analysis
suggest that Theorems 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 are fairly robust.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we present an approach to the theory of social communication based upon
the notion that information networks are created by individual decisions which trade o
the cost of forming and maintaining communication links against the potential rewards
from doing so.
This approach is developed with the help of a simple dynamic model in which individual
agents decide to form or severe links with some subset of their cohorts, at regular intervals.
We examine the long run behavior of this process. Our results establish that this process
invariably self-organizes, i.e., starting from every initial conguration of links it converges
to a limit social communication network, with probability one. Moreover, we show that
the limit network is either empty or a wheel, thus providing a complete characterization
of the set of self-organizing networks.
We show in the (corresponding) static network formation game that, while a variety of
architectures can be sustained in equilibrium, the wheel is the unique ecient architecture
20
for the interesting class of parameters. Thus, our results imply that the dynamics have
remarkable equilibrium selection properties.
Our analysis is carried out within the framework of a simple parametric model of social
communication. This framework is used for reasons of analytical tractability. In order
to investigate the robustness of our results, we consider an extension of the model which
allows for the quality of information to decay as it is communicated across agents. Prelimi-
nary work on this model suggests that in societies of moderate size, self-organization occurs
with high probability and that the limiting networks are natural generalizations of a wheel
network. Interestingly, in this case, self-organizing networks seem to be constituted of local
neighborhoods: dierent subsets of agents form small wheels { the local neighborhoods {
while other agents have links across these wheels.
The results we obtain are striking and it seems worthwhile to examine further extensions of
the framework. In particular, we assume that all agents have the same amount of valuable
private information and the same costs of link formation. We also assume that maintaining
an already established link has the same cost as creating a new link. Finally, we suppose
that information links are entirely asymmetric, while in reality both asymmetric and sym-
metric communication are seen to occur. The implications of relaxing these assumptions
need to be explored in future research.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1: If V > c then it is obvious that a sustainable network will be
connected. We shall assume that V < c.
26
Suppose g is a sustainable network which is not
empty. We show that it must be connected. The proof is by contradiction. Since g is not
the empty network, there exist distinct agents i and i
0
such that g
i;i
0
= 1. As V < c and g
is sustainable, there must exist i
00
62 fi; i
0
g such that g
i
0
;i
00
= 1, for otherwise i is better o
by cutting his link with i
0
. By the same token there exists i
000
62 fi
0
; i
00
g such that g
i
00
;i
000
= 1.
Since n is nite, we see that eventually there is a cycle of agents D = fj
1
; : : : ; j
m
g such
that
g
j
1
;j
2
= g
j
2
;j
3
=    = g
j
m 1
;j
m
= g
j
m
;j
1
= 1: (7)
26
The proof for the case V = c is available from the authors upon request.
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Let

D be dened as

D =
n
k 2 N j 9 j; j
0
2 D such that j
g
 ! k and k
g
 ! j
0
o
: (8)
The set

D consists of agents who observe some member of D and in turn are observed by
some member of D. It is easy to see by virtue of (7) that given k 2

D, we have k
g
 ! k
0
and k
0
g
 ! k if k
0
2

D, while for k
0
62

D at least one of these conditions is violated. Now
dene the set F as consisting of those agents outside of

D who are accessed by at least one
agent in

D, i.e.
F =
n
i 2 Nn

D j 9 j 2

D such that i
g
 ! j
o
: (9)
We show that F is empty. Suppose i 2 F . Clearly there is no path in g from an agent
in

D to i or else i would belong to

D. Let j 2

D be an agent who is at the short-
est distance from i, i.e. d(j; i; g) = min
fj
0
2

Dg
d(j
0
; i; g). Then there exists i
1
,i
2
,: : :,i
s
not
in

D such that g
j;i
1
=    = g
i
s
;i
= 1. Clearly, fi
1
; : : : ; i
s
g  F as well. As V < c,
there must be i
0
such that g
i;i
0
= 1, for otherwise agent i
s
would be strictly better o not
forming a link with i. Moreover, we see that i
0
62

D, for otherwise i 2

D contradicting
i 2 F . Hence i
0
2 F as well. Arguing the same way, there must be i
00
2 F such that
g
i
0
;i
00
= 1. Since F is a nite set, there must be a cycle of agents
^
D = fk
1
; : : : ; k
r
g  F
such that g
k
1
;k
2
=    = g
k
r
;k
1
= 1. Now suppose agent k
r
chooses to break the link
with k
1
and instead form a link with agent j 2 D. If the new network is denoted g
0
then 
k
r
(g
0
)   
k
r
(g)  j

DjV > 0 since the agent k
r
's cost is the same in both net-
works, while the agent also obtains the information of all agents in

D in the network
g
0
. Since k
r
can deviate and do better, g is not sustainable, contrary to supposition.
Hence F must be empty as required. In turn, this implies that for every j 2

D we have
N(j; g) =

D.
We now demonstrate that if k 2 Nn

D, then j
0
g
 ! k for some j
0
2

D. If not, then by
denition, N(k; g) \

D = ;, or equivalently N(k; g) \ N(j; g) = ; for all j 2

D. But if
we consider the network g
0
which is the same as g except that agent k forms an additional
link with some j 2

D, then

k
(g
0
)  
k
(g) = jN(j; g)jV   c  jN(j; g)jV   jN
d
(j; g)jc = 
g
(j)  V > 0: (10)
where the rst equality follows from the fact that agent k accesses the cycle

D in g
0
and did not do so in g, and the last but one inequality follows because agent j is in-
dividually rational and must be getting at least as much payo in g as by not form-
ing any links. This contradicts the assumption that g is sustainable. Hence for every
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k 2 Nn

D there is some j
0
2

D such that j
0
g
 ! k. Now let j be an agent in

D at the
closest distance to k, i.e. d(k; j; g) = min
fj
0
2Dg
d(k; j
0
; g). By construction of

D there
is some j

2

D with g
j

;j
= 1. Suppose agent j

deviates by cutting his link with j
and forming one with k instead: if g
0
denotes the new network, then 
j

(g
0
)   
j

(g) 
V > 0. This holds because j

's costs are the same in the two networks and j

accesses
all other agents in

D either through his remaining links with agents in

D or via k in
g
0
, and in addition gets k's information. Thus g is not sustainable as supposed. The
contradiction establishes that there does not exist k outside of

D, i.e. g is connected.
2
Sketch of Proof of Proposition 2.2: If a network g is sustainable and V > c it is
clearly connected. Suppose it is not minimally connected. Then there exist agents i and
j such that g
i;j
= 1, and the network g^ obtained by setting g
i;j
= 0 is still connected.
Since c > 0, agent i obtains a higher payo from g^ than from g, which contradicts the as-
sumption that g is sustainable. In the reverse direction, suppose g is minimally connected.
This implies that for any agent i 2 N , g
i;k
= 1 only if k 2 E where E 2 T, i.e. agent
i forms one and only one link with each of the `top' maximal components of the graph
g
0
 i
and no links with members of other maximal components.
27
The proof now follows
from the characterization of an agent's best response which is given in Lemma 3.3 below.
2
Proof of Proposition 2.3: For part (a) we show that g 2 S(V; c
0
) ) g 2 S(V; c).
Proposition 2.1 implies that g is either connected or empty. If g is empty then the
claim is clearly true since an empty network is sustainable for all c > V . We there-
fore focus on the case that g 2 S(V; c
0
) is connected. The proof proceeds by contra-
diction. Suppose g 62 S(V; c). Then there exists an agent i and a strategy g^
i
such
that

i
(g
 i
 g^
i
j c) > 
i
(g
 i
 g
i
j c): (11)
where 
i
( j c) is agent i's payo when the communication cost is c. In other words,
jN(i; g
 i
 g^
i
)jV   jN
d
(i; g
 i
 g^
i
)jc > jN(i; g
 i
 g
i
)jV   jN
d
(i; g
 i
 g
i
)jc (12)
which is equivalent to
n
jN(i; g
 i
 g^
i
)j   jN(i; g
 i
 g
i
)j
o
V >
n
jN
d
(i; g
 i
 g^
i
)j   jN
d
(i; g
 i
 g
i
)j
o
c: (13)
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This terminology is dened in the proof of Theorem 3.1 which is presented later in this appendix.
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The connectedness of g implies that jN(i; g
 i
 g
i
)j = n. Since jN(i; g
 i
 g^
i
)j  n =
jN(i; g
 i
 g
i
)j the above inequality implies jN
d
(i; g
 i
 g^
i
)j < jN
d
(i; g
 i
 g
i
)j. As c
0
> c,
this implies that
n
jN
d
(i; g
 i
 g^
i
)j   jN
d
(i; g
 i
 g
i
)j
o
c >
n
jN
d
(i; g
 i
 g^
i
)j   jN
d
(i; g
 i
 g
i
)j
o
c
0
: (14)
From (13) and (14) we obtain, after rearrangement:
jN(i; g
 i
 g^
i
)jV   jN
d
(i; g
 i
 g^
i
)jc
0
> jN(i; g
 i
 g
i
)jV   jN
d
(i; g
 i
 g
i
)jc
0
(15)
or equivalently

i
(g
 i
 g^
i
j c
0
) > 
i
(g
 i
 g
i
j c
0
): (16)
This contradicts the hypothesis that g 2 S(V; c
0
) and (a) follows. The proof for part (b)
is now straightforward. If g 2 S(V; c
0
) is the empty network g
e
then (b) holds trivially.
Otherwise the proof is exactly as in part (a). 2
Proof of Proposition 2.4: Consider part (a): since c < V any sustainable network
must be connected. Since the wheel and the star are minimally connected it is immediate
that no agent can protably deviate from their specied strategies, in these two cases. It
is easy to construct other networks, such as a sequence of stars linked together, which
are sustainable. Consider part (b) next: rst note that the wheel is sustainable since
every agent is forming the minimum number of links, 1, thus incurring a cost c, while
getting the maximum amount of benets, (n   1)V . The empty network is sustainable
because no agent has an incentive to form a link with an isolated agent, since c > V .
Similar considerations lead to the conclusion that the star is not sustainable. Finally in
part (c) note that since c > (n   1)V , the best response to any g
 i
is the strategy g
i
with g
i;j
= 0; 8j 2 Nnfig. Thus the only sustainable network is the empty network.
2
Proof of Proposition 2.5: First consider part (a). We begin by noting that if a net-
work is connected then it must have at least n links. Furthermore, as proved in the
Claim below, if a connected network has exactly n links it must be a wheel. For V > c,
an ecient network must be connected. Since the minimum number of links needed
to connect n agents is n, the above assertion thus directly implies that for these pa-
rameter values the wheel is the unique ecient network. Next consider the case where
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V < c < (n   1)V . Note that the welfare level provided by a wheel network g
w
is given
by
W (g
w
) = n
2
V   nc: (17)
By hypothesis, c < (n   1)V and so it follows that W (g
w
) > nV . Since the empty net-
work g
e
provides welfare W (g
e
) = nV < W (g
w
), it is not ecient. Let g be a network
in which the number of links L > n. Then W (g)  n
2
V   Lc < n
2
V   nc = W (g
w
)
so that g is not ecient. Likewise, if L = n and g 6= g
w
then g is not connected and
is again dominated by g
w
. Consider a network g in which L < n, so that g is not con-
nected. Suppose g is ecient. In such a network, at least n  L agents have no links with
other agents. Denote this set of agents by D. Since g is ecient, W (g)  W (g
w
) > nV .
Thus at least one agent (say) k must be getting a payo 
k
(g) > V . In particular, this
implies jN
d
(k; g)j  1. Now construct a network g
0
which has all the links in g and
in addition g
0
j;k
= 1 for some j 2 D. By construction, the payo in g
0
of every agent
i 2 Nnfjg will be at least as high as in g. In addition the payo of j is strictly higher
since

j
(g
0
) = jN(j; g
0
)jV   c  jN(k; g)jV   c  
k
(g) > V: (18)
Thus W (g
0
) > W (g), contradicting the hypothesis that g is ecient. Hence an ecient
network
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must have at least n links, and we have seen that g
w
is the unique architec-
ture which maximizes W () among all such networks. Consider part (b) next: note that
the minimum cost of link formation is c while the maximum benets are (n   1)V . For
c > (n   1)V it is then immediate that the unique ecient network must be the empty
network g
e
. 2
Claim: A connected network g with n links is a wheel.
Proof: Recall that to avoid trivialities we have assumed n  3. Since g is connected
and has n links, for every i 2 N there is one and only one j 2 Nnfig such that g
i;j
= 1.
Consider agent 1. Renumbering the agents if necessary, let g
1;2
= 1. If g
2;1
= 1 as
well, then there is no path from agent 3 to either 1 or 2 which violates connectedness.
Hence g
2;1
= 0 and suppose without loss of generality that g
2;3
= 1. More generally,
suppose for some k < n we have g
1;2
= g
2;3
=    = g
k 1;k
= 1. If g
k;i
= 1 for some
i 2 I  f1; : : : ; k   1g then there is no path from agent k + 1 to the agents in I, violat-
ing the connectedness of g. Thus g
k;j
= 1 for some j 2 NnI; renumbering if necessary,
let j = k + 1. Proceeding inductively we see that g
1;2
=    = g
n 1;n
= 1. If g
n;i
= 1
28
The existence of an ecient network is guaranteed since the number of feasible networks is nite.
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for some i > 1 then there is no path from 1 to agent n violating connectedness. The
contradiction proves that g
n;1
= 1. Since all the n links are accounted for, g is a wheel.
2
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Our rst objective is to characterize the best response of an agent to a network g 2 G. We
start by showing the following property of a best response. Recall that for a network g,
the network g
 i
is obtained by deleting all of i's links, i.e. replacing all edges of the form
g
i;j
= 1 with g
i;j
= 0.
Lemma 3.1 Given a network g = g
 i
g
i
in G, let g
0
 i
be the network obtained by replacing
all edges of the form g
j;i
= 1 with g
j;i
= 0 in g
 i
. Then BR
i
(g
 i
) = BR
i
(g
0
 i
).
Proof: Consider a strategy g
i
2 G
i
. Let g = g
 i
 g
i
. Clearly N
d
(i; g) = N
d
(i; g
0
 i
 g
i
), so
that the cost of strategy g
i
is the same in both networks. Since g
0
 i
 g
i
is a sub-network of
g, we have N(i; g
0
 i
 g
i
)  N(i; g). We show that N(i; g)  N(i; g
0
 i
 g
i
) as well. Suppose
k 6= i belongs to the former set. Then by denition there is a path k
g
 ! i. Since the path
does not involve any link of the form g
j;i
= 1, and the absence of such links constitutes
the only dierence between g = g
 i
 g
i
and g
0
 i
 g
i
, we also have a path from k to i in
the network g
0
 i
 g
i
. Hence k 2 N(i; g
0
 i
 g
i
). Thus i's payo is the same in both g and
g
0
 i
 g
i
. The result follows. 2
Lemma 3.1 implies that to obtain a best response of agent i we can start from a net-
work in which all the links that other agents have with i have been removed. Next, for
a network g, given a set E  N of agents and two distinct agents i,j 2 E, we say that
there is a path from j to i in E if either g
i;j
= 1 or if there exist agents j
1
, : : :, j
m
2 E
distinct from each other and i and j such that g
i;j
1
= : : : = g
j
m
;j
= 1. A path of this
type is denoted j
g;E
 ! i. Note that the relation `
g;E
 !' is transitive. If both j
g;E
 ! i and
i
g;E
 ! j hold, we write this as i
g;E
 ! j. We can now dene the useful notion of a compo-
nent.
Denition 3.1 A component of a network g is a set of agents E  N such that for all
i,j 2 E with i 6= j, we have j
g;E
 ! i. A component E of g is called maximal if there is no
strict superset E
0
 N which is also a component of g.
A single agent in a network g vacuously constitutes a component of g. An agent who
either does not have links with other agents or whom nobody has a link with is a maximal
component of g. We now have the following technical result:
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Lemma 3.2 Given a network g and i 2 N , let g
0
 i
be the network dened in Lemma 3.1.
Then there exists a unique partition of all agents in Nnfig into maximal components E
1
,
E
2
,: : :, E
m
of g
0
 i
. The class of sets in the partition is denoted as E.
The proof of this result is omitted due to space constraints; a copy of the proof is avail-
able from the authors. Lemma 3.2 allows us to characterize the nature of the best re-
sponse for an agent. Henceforth to distinguish the role of agent i, he will be referred
to as agent n. We start by extending the relation `$' to sets of agents: given a net-
work g and disjoint sets E, E
0
 N , we write E
g
 ! E
0
if for every j 2 E and every
j
0
2 E
0
we have j
g
 ! j
0
. We now apply this notion to the partition E obtained in
Lemma 3.2 associated with the network g = g
0
 n
. Given distinct E,E
0
2 E, it may be
veried that E
g
 ! E
0
if and only if the following seemingly weaker condition holds:
there exist k 2 E and k
0
2 E
0
such that k
g
 ! k
0
. Furthermore, E
g
 ! E
0
implies
E
0
g
 ! E cannot hold, since the two sets are maximal components. As the relation
`
g
 !' on E is nonreexive and transitive, it constitutes a strict partial order on E. We
dene the class T  E of `top' maximal components consisting of the largest elements
of E, i.e. E 2 T if there does not exist E
0
2 E such that E
g
 ! E
0
. It can be
seen that the class T is non-empty. Furthermore note that if E 2 EnT then there
must exist
^
E 2 T such that E
g
 !
^
E. We can now provide the following character-
ization of agent n's best response. Let T = [
E2T
E be the set of all `top' agents for
agent n.
Lemma 3.3 Suppose V > c > 0. Given the network g 2 G, g^
n
2 BR
n
(g
 n
) if and only
if for T as dened above for the network g
0
 n
, we have for all j 62 T , g^
n;j
= 0 and for all
E 2 T, g^
n;j(E)
= 1 for exactly one agent j(E) 2 E.
Proof: By Lemma 3.1, we can consider the agent n's best responses to the network
g = g
0
 n
. Suppose g^
n
is a best response to g. Let E and T be as dened above. Fix
E 2 T and let k 2 E. Since V > c and there is no agent k
0
2 NnE such that k
g
 ! k
0
(by denition of T) it must be the case that g^
n;j(E)
= 1 for some j(E) 2 E. Further-
more, it can easily be seen that N(j; g) = N(j
0
; g) for all j,j
0
2 E. Hence if g^
n;j
= 1
for some j 2 E other than j(E), the strategy obtained from g^
n
by replacing g^
n;j
= 1
with g^
n;j
= 0 will yield a strictly higher payo, as c > 0. The contradiction implies
that the agent j(E) must be unique. We now note that if k 62 T then there exists
E 2 T such that k 2 N(j(E); g). Thus if g^
n;k
= 1 the strategy obtained by deleting
this link would yield a strictly higher payo. The contradiction shows that g^
n;k
= 0
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must necessarily hold for all k 62 T . To show suciency, suppose g^
n
satises the con-
ditions of the Lemma. It is clearly the case that N(n; g  g^
n
) = N . Suppose that ~g
n
is a best response to g. Then since V > c, we must have N(n; g  ~g
n
) = N as well.
Hence for all E 2 T there must exist k(E) 2 E such that g
n;k(E)
= 1. It follows that
jN
d
(n; g  ~g
n
)j  jN
d
(n; g  g^
n
)j. Thus 
n
(g  g^
n
)  
n
(g  ~g
n
), and the result follows.
2
The proof of Theorem 3.1 repeatedly invokes the following useful property concerning the
best responses of an agent i.
Lemma 3.4 Let g be a network, and for i 2 N suppose g
i
2 BR
i
(g) where g = g
0
 i
. Let
K be a non-empty set of agents such that g
i;k
= 1 for all k 2 K. If
^
k is an agent satisfying
k
g
 !
^
k for all k 2 K, then the strategy g^
i
given by
g^
i;j
= g
i;j
for all j 62 K [ f
^
kg; g^
i;k
= 0 for all k 2 K; and g^
i;
^
k
= 1: (19)
is also a best response for agent i.
Proof: Note that by (19), jN
d
(i; g
 i
 g^
i
)j  jN
d
(i; g
 i
 g
i
)j, so that agent i's cost for
strategy g^
i
is at most that of using g
i
. The result is shown if N(i; g
 i
g
i
)  N(i; g
 i
 g^
i
),
which we now demonstrate. Let j belong to the former set. If j 2 K then since g^
i;
^
k
= 1
and j
g
 !
^
k, j belongs to the latter set. If j =
^
k then obviously j 2 N(i; g
 i
 g^
i
) as
well. Finally, suppose j 62 K [ f
^
kg. If g
i;j
= 1 then g^
i;j
= 1 by denition. Otherwise there
exist j
1
,: : :,j
m
distinct from each other and i and j such that g
j
1
;j
= : : : = g
j
m
;j
m 1
= 1
and g
i;j
m
= 1. There are three cases: (a) If fj
1
; : : : ; j
m
g \ (K [ f
^
kg) = ; then since
g^
i;j
m
= g
i;j
m
we have j 2 N(i; g
 i
 g^
i
). (b) If
^
k = j
p
for some j
p
2 fj
1
; : : : ; j
m
g then
since j
g
 ! j
p
=
^
k and g^
i;
^
k
= 1 we have j 2 N(i; g
 i
 g^
i
). (c) Finally if k = j
p
for
some k 2 K and j
p
2 fj
1
; : : : ; j
m
g, then j 2 N(i; g
 i
 g^
i
) since j
g
 ! j
p
= k, k
g
 !
^
k
and g^
i;
^
k
= 1. In all cases N(i; g
 i
 g
i
)  N(i; g
 i
 g^
i
) from which the result follows.
2
We now come to the main steps required to prove Theorem 3.1. It is easy to see that the
wheel is an absorbing state of the Markov chain. The strategy of the proof is to show that
every network other than the wheel is transient. This is proved by showing that given an
arbitrary network g dierent from the wheel, there is a positive probability of a transition
to the wheel in nitely many periods.
Recall that the network g is the initial state of the Markov chain. Consider agent n
rst. As above, suppose that E is the partition of maximal components induced by agent
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n in the network g = g
0
 n
formed by deleting all links to and from agent n. Recall
that T  E is the subclass of `top' maximal components. We now provide an alterna-
tive classication of the sets in E. Let B
1
 E consist of all the smallest elements of
E in the partial ordering `
g
 !' i.e. E 2 B
1
if there does not exist E
0
2 E such that
E
0
g
 ! E. Since E is nite, B
1
is non-empty. The class B
1
consists of the `bottom'
maximal components, whose agents do not have links with any agent outside their com-
ponents in the network g. For p  1, having dened B
p
, we then dene the class B
p+1
as:
B
p+1
= fE 2 EnE
p
j 9E
0
2 B
p
with E
0
g
 ! E; and 6 9E
00
2 EnE
p
with E
00
g
 ! Eg:
(20)
where E
p
= [
1qp
B
q
. Note that if EnE
p
is non-empty then so is B
p+1
. We proceed
recursively until all sets E 2 E are exhausted. Let B
1
,: : :,B
s
be the resulting collection of
classes. The classes B
1
to B
s
are pairwise disjoint and their union is E. We can regard the
sets in B
1
as being `bottom' sets or on the lowest `level', those in B
2
as the `second-lowest'
level and so on. The reason for our nomenclature is that in g, by construction, an agent in
a set E 2 B
p
can only be observed by agents in sets E
0
of level B
p+1
, B
p+2
etc., and never
by agents in the class B
p
(apart possibly from other agents in E) or agents in levels lower
than B
p
. Formally, we write:
Remark: If j lies in some set E 2 B
p
, and for some k 2 E
0
we have j
g
 ! k then either
E
0
= E or E
0
2 B
p
0
for some p
0
> p.
Note that for p  1, the class B
p
\ T may be non-empty, i.e. a component in E may be
both a `top' and belong to the p
th
level. Furthermore since B
s
is the highest class in the
hierarchy, we must have B
s
 T.
Now, by Lemma 3.3, agent n will choose a best response g^
n
such that for all E 2 T,
g^
n;j(E)
= 1 for exactly one j(E) 2 E and g^
n;j
= 0 for all other j 2 N . Let g
1
= g
 n
 g^
n
.
We note that due to the inertia assumption, g
1
occurs with strictly positive probability.
This is because each agent other than n independently maintains his original strategy with
positive probability, and agent n has a positive probability of choosing his best response g^
n
.
In what follows, since it is quite dicult to characterize the resulting network if more than
one agent chooses his best response simultaneously, we shall exploit this idea repeatedly:
we shall `pick' a particular agent, have him choose a best response (with certain proper-
ties), and construct the network in the next period assuming that every other agent has
displayed inertia. By the rules of the process, the resulting network occurs with positive
probability given its predecessor.
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The additional classication of the sets in E into the classes fB
q
g
s
q=1
can now be used to
establish a special case: for a certain class of networks there is a positive probability of
converging to the wheel in nitely many periods. We dene a hyperwheel to be a network
which contains the wheel as a sub-network.
Lemma 3.5 Suppose that the sets E 2 E are all singletons and that g
j;n
= 0 for all j,
i.e. no agent has a link with n in g (and hence also in g
1
). Then with positive probability,
the network g
1
converges to a hyperwheel.
Proof: Let B
1
 E consist of sets fB
1
1
; : : : ; B
q
1
1
g. By assumption, each B
k
1
2 B
1
consists
of a single agent. Refer to the agent in B
1
1
as j
1
1
. Consider the best response of j
1
1
. Since
V > c, we have N(n; g
1
) = N , i.e. n observes every agent in N . Thus if k 2 Nnfj
1
1
; ng
then k
g
1
 ! n. In fact, since j
1
1
2 B
1
1
2 B
1
, it must be the case that k
g
1
 j
1
1
 ! n as well.
This follows because the network g
1
is the same as g except for n's choice. Since by con-
struction j
1
1
is a `bottom' level agent and therefore does not observe anyone in g, the same
is true in g
1
. Thus any path from k to n must exist in the network g
1
independently
of j
1
1
, i.e. k
g
1
 j
1
1
 ! n as required. Now note that since k is arbitrary, there is a path from
every agent k to agent n in g
1
 j
1
1
. Hence by Lemma 3.4, we can choose agent j
1
1
's best
response g^
j
1
1
to g
1
to be simply g^
j
1
1
;n
= 1, and g^
j
1
1
;k
= 0 for all k 6= n. In other words,
j
1
1
need only form a link with agent n to obtain all the information in the society. Let
g
2
= g
1
 j
1
1
 g^
j
1
1
be the network formed when j
1
1
chooses his best response in this way, with
all other agents exhibiting inertia. By the rules of the process, g
2
occurs with positive
probability.
Next consider B
2
1
2 B
1
. Refer to the agent in B
2
1
as j
2
1
. Note that in g
2
the structure of
the network g
1
is unaltered except for j
1
1
's choice, which in turn is unaltered from g except
for n's choice. In particular, if k 2 Nnfj
1
; ng, then k
g
2
 j
1
1
 ! n. However, since j
2
1
2 B
2
1
2 B
1
,
j
2
1
does not observe any agent in g, and hence, since he has displayed inertia throughout,
in g
1
and g
2
as well. Thus, for every k 2 Nnfj
1
; ng there is a path in g
2
from k to n inde-
pendent of j
2
1
as well, i.e. k
g
2
 j
2
1
 ! n. It follows from Lemma 3.4 that j
2
1
has a best response
g^
j
2
1
satisfying g^
j
2
1
;k
= 0 for all k 62 fj
1
; ng. Furthermore, since g
2
j
1
1
;n
= 1 as well, applying
Lemma 3.4 again, j
2
1
's best response can be chosen simply as g^
j
2
1
;j
1
1
= 1 with g^
j
2
1
;k
= 0 for
every other k. Let g
3
= g
2
 j
2
1
 g^
j
2
1
. Once again, there is a positive probability of getting
to g
3
given g
2
.
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We now proceed in the same fashion until all sets in B
1
are exhausted. The resulting
network (call it g
4
) has the property that the structure of the network for all levels above
B
1
are the same as in g
1
, and g
4
j
1
1
;n
= g
4
j
2
1
;j
1
1
=    = g
4
j
q
1
1
;j
q
1
 1
1
= 1. We now consider
sets in B
2
. Let them be numbered as fB
1
2
; : : : ; B
q
2
2
g. Denote the agent in B
1
2
as j
1
2
.
Since all agents in B
2
or higher levels have exhibited inertia, the network g
4
has the
same structure for the sets in B
2
and higher as in g
1
. In particular, given any k 2 E
for
E 2
n
B
2
2
; : : : ; B
q
2
2
o
[
[
fE
0
2B
p
: p3g
E
0
(21)
we have k
g
4
 j
1
2
 ! n for the same reasons as before. Applying Lemma 3.4 again, we can choose
j
1
2
's best response g^
j
1
2
to satisfy g^
j
1
2
;j
q
1
1
= 1 with g^
j
1
2
;k
= 0 for all other k. The new network
(which again occurs with positive probability) is g
5
= g
4
 j
1
2
 g^
j
1
2
, assuming as before that
all other agents exhibit inertia.
We repeat the process in the same way for all the remaining sets in B
2
and then for the
sets in each higher level in turn until all levels and each set in each level is exhausted. The
resulting network g
6
satises
g
6
j
1
1
;n
= g
6
j
2
1
;j
1
1
=    = g
6
j
q
1
1
;j
q
1
 1
1
= g
6
j
1
2
;j
q
1
1
=    = g
6
j
1
s
;j
q
s 1
s 1
=    = g
6
j
q
s
s
;j
q
s
 1
s
= 1: (22)
Furthermore, recall that B
s
 T. Since agent n is assumed to display inertia from g
1
to g
6
,
and in g
1
we have g
1
n;j(E)
= 1 for each E 2 T and some j(E) 2 E, we have (in particular)
g
6
n;j
q
s
s
= g
1
n;j
q
s
s
= 1. Thus the network g
6
contains a wheel, i.e. it is a hyperwheel. The
result follows. 2
The following lemma establishes convergence to the wheel with positive probability for the
special case above.
Lemma 3.6 Suppose V > c and g
6
is a hyperwheel as above. Then there is a strictly
positive probability that g
6
will transit in one period to a wheel.
Proof: The only agent who potentially has superuous links is agent n, since in g
6
(as in
g
1
) he has a link with an agent in each E 2 T. We now assume that n alone chooses a
best response to g
6
. Note that by equation (22), there is a path from every j 62 fn; j
q
s
s
g
to j
q
s
s
in g
6
. Hence by Lemma 3.4, we can assume without loss of generality that agent n
chooses g^
n
as his best response to g
6
dened as g^
n;j
q
s
s
= 1 with g^
n;k
= 0 for all other k. The
resulting network g
7
= g
6
 n
 g^
n
is a wheel. 2
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In the more general case, if g is the original network, the maximal components E 2 E of
the network g = g
0
 n
may consist of many agents linked together. In addition, individual
agents j 2 E may have links with agent n in g, i.e. g
j;n
= 1. The proof now needs to be
extended to take into account these possibilities.
Recall that the network g
1
= g
 n
 g^
n
is obtained from the original network g after n
chooses his best response. As before E is the partition of maximal components induced
by g
0
 n
and T is the collection of `top' maximal components. In addition, B
1
, B
2
, : : :, B
s
are exactly as dened prior to Lemma 3.5. Lastly, each class B
p
consists of the maximal
components fB
1
p
; : : : ; B
q
p
p
g; unlike the special case considered earlier, these sets may not
be singletons.
We now proceed inductively. For some p  1 and some m  1 consider the set B
m
p
2 B
p
.
Suppose that the current state of the Markov chain is a network g
2
with the following
properties:
(a) g
2
n
= g
1
n
.
(b) For all k 2 F , where
F =
q
p
[
r=m+1
B
r
p
[
[
fE2B
p
0
:p
0
>pg
E (23)
we have g
2
k
= g
1
k
= g
k
.
(c) Property (b) also holds for k 2 B
m
p
, i.e. g
2
k
= g
1
k
= g
k
.
(d) The agents in
J 
[
fE2B
p
0
: p
0
<pg
E [
m 1
[
r=1
B
r
p
: (24)
are arranged as a `linear chain', i.e. J = fj
1
; : : : ; j
w
g where g
2
j
1
;n
= g
2
j
2
;j
1
=    =
g
2
j
w
;j
w 1
= 1 and the agents in J do not have any other links.
We can then prove that the network g
2
will transit with positive probability to a network
g
3
where the chain J will be extended by the agents in B
m
p
. The proof uses a technique
we label as `geodesic descent'. Consider a network ~g and recall that given two agents
i and j, a geodesic from j to i is a path of the shortest length from j to i in ~g. The
length of a geodesic from j to i is denoted d(i; j; ~g). (If no path exists from j to i, then
d(i; j; ~g) = 1 by convention). Furthermore, if E  N , and i,j 2 E, an E-geodesic from
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j to i is a path of the shortest length, when only paths from j to i entirely within E are
considered. Furthermore, let d(i; j; ~g; E) denote the length of an E-geodesic from j to i. If
there is no path in E from j to i we write d(i; j; ~g; E) =1 as in the earlier case. We now
show:
Lemma 3.7 Let the state of the system be g
2
, where g
2
satises properties (a) to (d).
Furthermore, denote the agents in B
m
p
as fk
1
; : : : ; k
r
g. Then there is a positive probability
that the system will move to a network g
3
where properties (a) and (b) continue to hold, and
there is a linear chain J
0
= fj
1
; : : : ; j
w
; k
1
; : : : ; k
r
g containing J which satises g
3
j
1
;n
=
g
3
j
2
;j
1
=    = g
3
j
w
;j
w 1
= g
3
k
1
;j
w
=    = g
3
k
r
;k
r 1
= 1. Furthermore, the agents in J
0
do not
have any other links in g
3
.
Proof: Suppose (a) to (d) hold in g
2
. Since V > c, g
2
n
= g
1
n
, and g
1
n
is a best response to
g
 n
, we must have B
m
p
 N(n; g
2
). Hence there exists some k
u
2 B
m
p
and some i
0
2 F [fng
such that g
2
i
0
;k
u
= 1. Relabelling the agents for convenience, suppose k
u
is k
r
, i.e. g
2
i
0
;k
r
= 1.
By (a) and (b) and the above argument, there is a path in g
2
from k
r
to n which does not
involve any agent in B
m
p
.
Recall that B
m
p
is a component of g = g
0
 n
; by virtue of (c), it continues to be a component
of g
2
. Hence for every k 2 B
m
p
nfk
r
g we have k
g
2
;B
m
p
 ! k
r
. Choose an agent k 2 B
m
p
nfk
r
g who
maximizes d(k
r
; k; g
2
; B
m
p
), i.e. with whom k
r
has the longest B
m
p
-geodesic. Relabelling the
agents again if necessary, suppose without loss of generality that k
1
is this agent. We now
note that if k 2 fk
2
; : : : ; k
r 1
g then by the choice of k
1
, we have k
g
2
 k
1
;B
m
p
 ! k
r
. (If this were
not true, then the shortest path within B
m
p
from k to k
r
would have to pass through agent
k
1
, in which case d(k
r
; k; g
2
; B
m
p
) > d(k
r
; k
1
; g
2
; B
m
p
), which contradicts the denition of
k
1
).
Since for each k 2 fk
2
; : : : ; k
r 1
g we have k
g
2
 k
1
;B
m
p
 ! k
r
, and there is a path from k
r
to
n independent of the agents in B
m
p
, this implies k
g
2
 k
1
;B
m
p
 ! n as well. Next note that
from (a) and (b), there is a path from every agent i
0
2 F to n independently of the
agents in B
m
p
. Finally, note from (d) that there is a path from n to j
w
also independent
of the agents in B
m
p
. Using all these observations, we see that there is a path in g
2
 k
1
from every k 6= k
1
to j
w
. Hence, applying Lemma 3.4, agent k
1
has a best response g^
k
1
which is simply g^
k
1
;j
w
= 1 and g^
k
1
;j
= 0 for any other agent. Let _g = g
2
 k
1
 g^
k
1
be
the network formed when k
1
chooses this best response and all other agents show iner-
tia.
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Next consider the remaining agents in B
m
p
. Fix k 2 fk
2
; : : : ; k
r 1
g. By the choice of k
1
we
have k
g
2
 k
1
;B
m
p
 ! k
r
. Since _g
 k
1
= g
2
 k
1
by construction, k
_g
 k
1
;B
m
p
 ! k
r
as well, i.e. there is a
path from k to k
r
in _g independent of k
1
. In particular, d(k
r
; k; _g; B
m
p
) <1. Furthermore,
note that in _g the B
m
p
-geodesic from k to k
r
cannot involve k
1
since k
1
has no longer any
links within B
m
p
. Now choose an agent in fk
2
; : : : ; k
r
g to maximize d(k
r
; k; _g; B
m
p
). Rela-
belling the agents if necessary let k
2
be such an agent. Now, if k 2 fk
3
; : : : ; k
r 1
g then
k
_g
 k
2
;B
m
p
 ! k
r
as well. If not, all paths from k to k
r
(at least one exists since k
_g;B
m
p
 ! k
r
) must
pass through k
2
. But then d(k
r
; k; _g; B
m
p
) > d(k
r
; k
2
; _g; B
m
p
), which contradicts the choice
of k
2
.
Since in _g there is a path from every agent k 2 fk
3
; : : : ; k
r 1
g to k
r
independently of k
2
or k
1
, the same logic as used earlier with k
1
leads to the conclusion that k
2
can obtain
all the information in the society by forming a link with k
1
alone; formally, he has a best
response g^
k
2
which is g^
k
2
;k
1
= 1, g^
k
2
;j
= 0 for all other j. Let g = _g
 k
2
 g^
k
2
be the
new network formed in this way. We can then repeat the above steps with all the agents
fk
3
; : : : ; k
r
g in succession to arrive a network g
3
which satises the conditions of the lemma.
2
Note that the situation of B
m+1
p
2 B
p
in g
3
is identical to that of B
m
p
2 B
p
in g
2
. Hence
we can continue the inductive step. In this way we exhaust all the maximal components
in B
p
before moving on to the next level and so on until all levels are exhausted. The end
result is a hyperwheel g
4
, as in the special case of Lemma 3.5. Thus applying Lemma 3.6
to the hyperwheel g
4
, we see that every network has a positive probability of converging
to the wheel, which is an absorbing state. Theorem 3.1 now follows from standard results
on Markov chains.
Proof of Theorem 3.2: (Sketch) When V < c there exist networks g such that
the best response of every agent i to g
 i
is to form no links. Let the set of such net-
works be given by G
1
. Also dene G
2
= GnG
1
to the set of networks such that there
is at least one agent whose best response involves forming some links. It is easily ver-
ied that if g 2 G
1
then the Markov process starting from g converges to the empty
network g
e
with probability 1. From now on we therefore concentrate our attention on
G
2
.
Step 1 Consider a network g 2 G
2
. By denition, there is some agent n whose best re-
sponse to g = g
0
 n
involves forming some links. It is not dicult to show the following
characterization of agent n's best response:
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g^n
2 BR
n
(g) only if for the network g
0
 n
and T as dened above, we have (i) if j 62 T =
[
E2T
E then g^
n;j
= 0 and (ii) if for some E 2 T, and j(E) 2 E we have g^
n;j(E)
= 1,
then j(E) is unique.
As before, allow agent n to play his best response, with the remaining agents displaying
inertia. Dene g
1
= g
 n
 g^
n
.
Step 2 There are two cases to be considered: (1) for all j such that n
g
1
 ! j we also have
j
g
1
 ! n, and (2) there exists a j such that n
g
1
 ! j but not j
g
1
 ! n.
We consider case (1) rst. Dene the classes fB
q
g
s
q=1
as before. Let B
1
= fB
1
1
; : : : ; B
q
1
1
g
be the bottom components and start with B
1
1
. Assume initially that it is a singleton, and
let j
1
1
be this agent. There are two subcases: (i) j
1
1
g
1
 ! n and (ii) there does not exist a
path in g
1
from j
1
1
to n.
In subcase (i) we show that j
1
1
has a best response which involves forming a link with some
agent. If he forms no link he will obtain V . If he forms a link with n then he obtains a
payo of jN(n; g
1
)jV   c. However,
jN(n; g
1
)jV   c  jN(n; g
1
)jV   jN
d
(n; g
1
)jc  V: (25)
The rst inequality is obvious since jN
d
(n; g
1
)j  1 by assumption. The second follows
because agent n must be obtaining at least V with his best response. Thus agent j
1
1
has a
best response with a non-zero number of links. We next argue that j
1
1
has a best response
g^
j
1
1
such that
g^
j
1
1
;n
= 1 and g^
j
1
1
;j
0
= 0 for all other j
0
: (26)
The proof is as follows. Suppose j
1
1
has a best response which involves forming a link
with an agent j
0
dierent from n and not forming one with n. If j
0
2 N(n; g
1
) then an
application of Lemma 3.4 shows that the link with j
0
can be replaced by a link with n
instead. Suppose j
0
62 N(n; g
1
). Since when n chose his best response he did not form a
link with j
0
, it must be the case that
jN(n; g
1
)jV   jN
d
(n; g
1
)jc  jN(j
0
; g
 n
0
)j   c: (27)
The left hand side is n's payo by playing his best response, while the right is his payo
from forming a link with j
0
instead in g
 n
. Since by (25) agent j
1
1
obtains jN(n; g
1
)jV   c
by forming a link with n alone, which is at least as large as the left-hand side of (27), we
can assume that forming a link with n is as good as forming one with j
0
instead. The last
35
situation to consider is when j
1
1
has a best response which involves links with both n and
some j
0
62 N(n; g
1
). This can also be ruled out, because if n did not nd it worthwhile
to form a link with j
0
, then j
1
1
cannot do so either. Thus we can assume without loss of
generality that (26) holds. Let the new network formed when j
1
1
chooses his best response
in this way be given by g
2
= g
1
 j
1
1
 g^
j
1
1
.
In the more general situation of subcase (i), B
1
1
may not be a singleton. Let B
1
1
=
fj
1
1
; : : : ; j
r
1
g and suppose there is a path from j
r
1
to n in g
1
. In this case we employ
the method of geodesic descent as in Lemma 3.7. Following the same logic, we can show
that the agents in B
1
1
will align themselves with positive probability in a chain, i.e. there
will be a new network g
2
formed where every agent outside B
1
1
is unchanged from g
1
, and
the agents in B
1
1
satisfy g
2
j
1
1
;n
= g
2
j
2
1
;j
1
1
=    = g
2
j
r
1
;j
r 1
1
= 1.
We now come to subcase (ii), which is simpler. When B
1
1
is a singleton fj
1
1
g, this is the
situation where there is no path from j
1
1
to n in g
1
. Here a similar argument to (i) es-
tablishes that j
1
1
has a best response which involves forming a link with n alone. In the
more general situation where B
1
1
= fj
1
1
; : : : ; j
r
1
g we consider j
r
1
and arrange the remaining
agents in B
1
1
in terms of decreasing geodesic distance. Starting with the agent having the
maximum distance, we show that he has a best response which involves forming a link with
n alone. The remaining agents are chosen as in the method of geodesic descent, to link up
as in subcase (i) to form the network g
2
.
Finally, we note that the above arguments apply in case (1). Recall that this is the
case where the best response of n is such that if there is a path from some j to n
in g
1
the same is true in the opposite direction. The analysis of the complementary
case proceeds as follows: we start by noting that agent j
1
1
2 B
1
1
has a best response
in which he forms a link with the component which is \furthest" away from B
1
1
rather
than forming a link with agent n. The arguments developed above can now be applied
with only slight modication to allow for some relabelling of the ordering of the compo-
nents.
Step 3 We now proceed as in Theorem 3.1 to carry out the above operations on the
remaining components in B
1
and then with the components in B
2
, B
3
, : : :, B
s
. The
nal outcome is a hyperwheel, after which we apply Lemma 3.6 to obtain the result.
2
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